




PROTECTING DEMOCRACY: FOREIGN INTERFERENCE, VOTER CONFIDENCE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES IN THE 2020 ELECTIONS AND BEYOND

CONFERENCE REPORT



Presented by:

**Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law (CERL)
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School**

Center for a New American Security (CNAS)

Annenberg Public Policy Center (APPC)

Executive Summary¹

On September 17, 2020, the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law (“CERL”) at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, in partnership with the Center for a New American Security (“CNAS”) and the Annenberg Public Policy Center (“APPC”), hosted a conference titled *Protecting Democracy: Foreign Interference, Voter Confidence, and Defensive Strategies in the 2020 Elections and Beyond*. The conference addressed election security, foreign and domestic interference with elections, and voter confidence. Participants evaluated various interference prevention strategies and discussed recommendations that could be implemented to prevent interference in future U.S. elections.

During the two public panel discussions and the two closed sessions, panelists and participants largely agreed that domestically generated disinformation, which is often amplified by foreign actors, poses one of the greatest threats to the integrity of U.S. elections because it undermines voter confidence and exacerbates voter suppression. There was also widespread concern that unsubstantiated claims relating to ballot fraud may stifle early voting and that Election Day disinformation may be disseminated to prevent or at least discourage citizens from going to the polls. Consequently, panelists and participants underscored the responsibility of local news networks, national media outlets, and the academic community to combat these false narratives. Portions of the conference also focused on the benefits and limitations of an international law framework to address election interference and the lessons the United States can glean from the election security strategies of Western European democracies, Eastern European countries, and other nations. The conference concluded that a comprehensive, multi-faceted approach is needed to effectively address election security issues, which includes bolstering the security of election infrastructure, combating foreign and domestic disinformation, and implementing a robust voter education campaign.

Morning Program **(Public)**

Session 1: Patterns of Foreign Election Interference Since 2016

Session Background:

In April 2016, U.S. intelligence agencies became aware that Russia was working to interfere in the 2016 presidential election. This conclusion was not only borne out by further investigations on the part of the [intelligence community](#) but also by [the Mueller report](#), [the Senate Intelligence Committee](#), and [numerous news and media outlets that were able to substantiate the intelligence community’s initial assessment](#). Weaponized social media campaigns, the hacking of voter registration databases, theft of private campaign communications, and the injection of dark money into political campaigns threatened the legitimacy of our electoral process. Given the “success” of Russia’s efforts in 2016, documented patterns of Russian interference in elections in

¹ This report has been produced by CERL with the assistance of Ashley Fuchs, Alana Sheppard, and Robert Stoffa. Ms. Fuchs, Ms. Sheppard, and Mr. Stoffa were interns in CERL’s 2020 Summary Internship Program.

Western Europe, the continuing pattern of Russian interference in the mid-term elections, and intelligence community reports since the 2016 elections, it is safe to assume that Russia is continuing to interfere with U.S. elections in the run up to the 2020 presidential election.

Since then we have learned that other countries are attempting to influence the 2020 election by using the 2016 Russian playbook. A 2019 [Princeton University study](#) documented dozens of foreign influence efforts by Russia, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. The [Alliance for Securing Democracy reports](#) that the Chinese are using Russian social media tactics to undermine confidence in democratic governance as well as to highlight its own governance model. In October 2019, [Microsoft released a statement](#) indicating that a group of hackers it believed to be linked to the Iranian government attempted to gain information on 2,700 consumer e-mail accounts and hacked into 241 of them. Microsoft has also [obtained a court order to seize control of 50 websites](#) used by North Korean operatives to launch spear phishing attacks on government officials.

Moderator:

[Claire Finkelstein](#), Algernon Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy and Faculty Director of the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Panelists:

[James Clapper](#), Former U.S. Director of National Intelligence and CERL Executive Board Member
[Kathleen Hall Jamieson](#), Elizabeth Ware Packard Professor of Communication at the University of Pennsylvania's Annenberg School for Communication, Walter and Leonore Director of the Annenberg Public Policy Center, and Program Director of the Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands

Summary:

This session examined the current state of foreign interference in democracies worldwide and in the 2020 U.S. election. The discussion reflected on Russian interference in the 2016 election, assessed the United States' response to election security issues over the past four years, and anticipated problems that may arise before the upcoming November election. One panelist began by discussing the Soviet Union's longstanding history of election interference. Since the Cold War and directly prior to 2016, the Russians capitalized on new technology to increase the depth, scope, and aggression of their interference. They utilized a multi-pronged approach, including sophisticated propaganda campaigns as well as hacking and dumping operations, to exploit the United States' polarization and divisiveness. The panelists agreed that the Intelligence Community ("IC") should have been more forthright in publicizing Russian interference in 2016 and should embrace a policy of transparency when informing the public of the threats posed by Russia, Iran, and China in upcoming elections.

Next, a panelist emphasized that Russia's social media campaign was not enough to shift the election results given that the majority of the content was not election related. By contrast, the hacked content changed the media agenda, created message imbalances, and had a discernable impact on the election results. Although the IC conveyed on October 7, 2016, that the Russians were behind the DNC hacking, journalists could not have assumed that the Russians were also

behind the Podesta e-mails, which were released on the same day. The Access Hollywood tape further emasculated the IC's announcement, forcing Russian interference out of the media agenda and shifting the focus of the October 9, 2016, debate. In other words, the hacked content created a counterbalancing framework of the Podesta e-mails versus the Access Hollywood tape, relegating the IC announcement to the forgotten periphery of the media agenda.

The panelists agreed that there is heightened awareness and sensitivity to the threats posed by Russia in 2020, although they do not have a high level of confidence that the media and U.S. government will take proper action to effectively deal with hacked content. First and foremost, hacked content must be independently verified and should not be taken out of context. When considering the United States' preparedness in 2020, one panelist noted that the 2018 midterm election was not a good indication of how the United States has combatted Russian interference and managed disinformation and hacked content because Russia has historically concentrated its efforts on presidential elections.

The panelists then transitioned to a discussion of how the decentralized nature of the U.S. voting system dictates what prevention strategies can and should be implemented. To begin, efforts to combat Election Day disinformation must be localized. Election officials need to verify or deny what has been postulated on social media, such as alleged threats or closures at polling places. Local news networks, national media outlets, and the academic community must actively police disinformation and be vigilant of imposture news sites. In regard to foreign disinformation, social media companies have made it more difficult for foreign actors to buy political ads, such as source identification on YouTube content; however, the panelists agreed additional measures are needed to target domestically generated disinformation. While it is important to secure and protect polling locations, the panelists warned against the deployment of law enforcement, noting that federal police will likely intimidate voters in minority communities.

The panelists concluded their discussion by discussing that 2020 is a significantly different environment due to the widespread loss of confidence in government entities, the heightened polarization, and President Donald Trump's constant attacks aimed at undermining the integrity of federal agencies. This distrust has far-reaching consequences for both independent certifications of the election results and COVID-19 public health information. While all the panelists agreed that verification after the ballots are cast is essential to restoring voter confidence, they doubt whether the public will trust any purportedly bipartisan election commission.

Session 2: Voter Attitudes and Foreign Influence: The Pandemic and Other Wedge Issues

Session Background:

Sixty-three percent of people [recently surveyed](#) by the Associated Press and the University of Chicago said they were concerned about at least one form of foreign influence in our elections. Seventy-one percent of people [surveyed by the Pew Research Center in 2018](#) said that foreign influence is a major problem. But the general public's concern alone does not prevent or combat influence. Indeed, foreign influence can be seen in the uncontested facts underlying the impeachment trial of President Trump. The president acted to prevent the release of millions of dollars in congressionally authorized military aid to an ally to force that government to conduct investigations into a political rival. While most politicians agreed that the president's conduct was

“[wrong](#),” a majority of the Senate decided it was not a “high crime or misdemeanor,” and [a sizable portion of the American population agreed with that decision](#). Was this a unique situation confined to this moment in time, or is it a harbinger of a new political reality? Despite the polls indicating widespread concern with foreign interference, have Americans become apathetic about the dangers it poses to U.S. democracy?

Oddly, the lack of concern in the U.S. population persists, despite the numerous instances in which foreign governments and political action groups are explicit about their intentions and completely open. Foreign governments have openly spent over \$1 billion to influence American policy since 2017. As required by the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), countries like [South Korea, Japan, Israel, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates](#) have registered their efforts and have admitted to spending millions of dollars on attempting to influence policy and politicians.

Meanwhile, as the world is dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, our adversaries are spreading disinformation and propaganda about the United States. A [recent unpublished report](#) by the State Department [Global Engagement Center](#) highlighted the efforts of Iran, China, and Russia to shift blame for the outbreak of the disease to the United States as well as position China as a global leader in the fight against the pandemic. These efforts serve the dual purpose of insulating domestic governments from blame for their failed response to the pandemic and uniting the messaging of the U.S. adversaries.

As state and local election officials scramble to deal with the multitude of issues that the pandemic poses for the 2020 elections, have the federal government and the private sector taken steps to combat the spread of disinformation about the pandemic? Has the messaging of foreign actors related to the pandemic changed to influence the election? Is there anything different about the messaging surrounding the pandemic from earlier disinformation campaigns meant to influence elections?

Moderator:

[Carrie Cordero](#), Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow, CNAS

Panelists:

[Laura Rosenberger](#), Director, Alliance for Securing Democracy, German Marshall Fund

[Bill Kristol](#), Director, Defending Democracy Together; Editor-at-Large, The Bulwark

[Scott Bates](#), Deputy Secretary of State, Connecticut

[Vanita Gupta](#), President and CEO, The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights

Summary:

This session addressed what civil society and government can do to combat foreign influence in the 2020 election in a way that addresses voter concerns.

It began with a discussion on what is known about the current state of election interference efforts by foreign actors in the 2020 election. Foreign actors have been taking advantage of weakness in the United States body politic. Ahead of 2020, Russia is not injecting content so much as amplifying content that already exists in a way to impact the domestic debate. China and Iran have also been identified as foreign actors attempting to interfere in the election.

Next the session turned to a discussion of what is being done on at the state level to foster integrity in elections, with Connecticut being used as a case study. Most states have few resources to combat foreign interference efforts, and assistance from the federal government (notably money appropriated through the Help America Votes Act and CARES Act) is instrumental for helping states secure their elections from external tampering. In Connecticut, \$5.4 million in federal grant money was used to address three priorities: implementing cyber security measures to protect voting machines from hacking; training personnel, hiring IT specialists, and hiring five election security officers; and promoting absentee balloting and countering disinformation.

After addressing the role that state governments play, the session turned to addressing how civil society and other organizations are acting to ensure the integrity of the election. The Russians did not invent strategies to discourage people from voting; such efforts to suppress the vote have been present in the United States for a long time. Civil rights advocates anticipated that we would see unprecedented efforts to impede the right to vote in the 2020 election, though the COVID-19 pandemic has created novel opportunities for voter suppression. Civil society must convince voters that they can be empowered even in these times, as voter suppression encompasses physical, procedural, and even intangible impediments such as inculcating fear. Next, the session addressed the concern, or lack thereof, about foreign interference within the electorate. Panelists noted that voters are not aware of how to combat foreign interference. The federal government does not appear to have mobilized against foreign interference after 2016, at least overtly, leaving local officials to take unilateral action to meet the threat. While the average voter might not be fully aware of the degree of mobilization against foreign interference, they are supportive of the efforts to ensure that we have a fair and free election in November.

Next, a question was posed: Given that more information can lead to more confusion, just how much information should the government be telling people about foreign interference? The panelists concluded that the government must strike a balance between being transparent with public and not creating a self-fulfilling prophecy where people will doubt election result will be secure. Providing a blow-by-blow account of every facet of a foreign interference effort may chip away at public trust, and such detailed analysis is probably better served for intelligence assessments after the election. Additionally, the public should be informed in plain terms how they are able to vote safely and make use of expanded voting options.

After this, the session discussed whether a winner for the presidential race will be called on election night or if it may take days to determine the winner. Due to the unprecedented number of people voting by mail, this will be an election unlike any we have seen before. There will likely be a good deal of litigation related to absentee ballot rejection after the election, although there is already litigation going on to try to pre-empt the need for back-end litigation after the election. If democracy is working on November 3, Americans probably will not know who won the election on that night.

A follow-up question was then posed: How can we foster voter confidence when we do not have a result by November 3? While the media has begun to raise the prospect that we might not know the election outcome by election night, the media likely could do more to convey this reality. Panelists recommended that states should count as many absentee ballots as possible beforehand to help prevent the election counting period from dragging on longer than it has to. Some panelists expressed optimism that prior voter experience with recounts will prevent a sense of illegitimacy if results are not readily apparent. However, other panelists were more pessimistic due to the polarized national climate and a president making public statements that appear motivated to delegitimize the elections. In either event, state and local election officials will play a critical role in standing up for the integrity of the vote count in their jurisdictions against attempts to call those totals into question.

The session concluded with panelists commenting briefly on the best way to prevent foreign governments from exploiting domestic issues. From the perspective of the government, combatting foreign interference needs to be a national priority, and partnerships need to be formed on the state and local level. States need to set aside money to talk directly to public. Additionally, election security needs to be depoliticized and the domestic issues that give foreign actors fodder, such as racial injustice, need to be addressed. From the perspective of the individual voter, making a plan to vote and critically engaging with content on social media can help ensure they are not exploited by foreign actors.

Afternoon Program **(Closed)**

Session Three: Prevention Strategies and Their Effectiveness

Session Background:

A February 2018 [report from the Center for American Progress](#) graded the election security measures of all 50 states and found vast differences among them. No state earned an “A” grade, and 16 states earned a “D” or “F.”

After the 2016 elections, Congress passed legislation aimed at protecting federal elections. In 2018 and 2020, [Congress allocated a total of \\$805 million dollars](#) to the states under the Help America Vote Act of 2002 for improvements to the administration of federal elections. According to the [U.S. Election Assistance Commission report](#) to Congress, every state and U.S. territory applied for funding and used the federal financial support to improve cybersecurity, voting equipment, voting registration, election auditing, and communication to voters. In 2017, the Department of Human Services [designated the system used to administer elections as “critical infrastructure”](#) and tasked the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to offer support to state and local officials in charge of administering elections. There are other proposals, however, that have not been enacted. The “[Honest Ads Act](#),” “[Election Security Act](#),” and “[Securing America’s Federal Elections Act](#)” have all been introduced in Congress, but none has garnered enough support to become law.

The private sector, in particular [social media companies](#), have taken steps to prevent foreign interference in the 2020 election. Facebook has undertaken a [series of initiatives](#) to fight foreign interference, increase transparency, and prevent the spread of misinformation on its platform. [Twitter and Google](#) have banned all political advertising from their sites and have taken steps to increase transparency and limit the prevalence of malicious bots from their platforms. Despite these attempts, the tactics of foreign actors are evolving and [gaps in security remain](#).

Other democracies have also enacted measures to protect their elections. A [2018 report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](#) outlined the efforts that a variety of European countries made in the wake of interference in the U.S. 2016 presidential election and made a series of recommendations to U.S. policymakers based on the actions of European nations. What lessons have U.S. leaders learned from our European counterparts? Is the United States in a position to reproduce some of the initiatives that have been successful in other countries?

Summary:

This session, closed to the public, began with a poll to participants asking, “What is the greatest threat to American elections?” with the following answer options: civic education, the media, election administration, domestic interference, and foreign interference. (Results are below.)

The participants first discussed the benefits and limitations of using an international law framework to address foreign interference and compared U.S. election security strategies to that of other countries. In assessing the possible advantages some European countries have to combat election security threats, the participants noted broader efforts to engage with education, voluntary conversations about election issues, and open dialogues with and about the media. Many emphasized the importance of resilience in response to election security threats. The poll results revealed domestic interference was the highest concern among conference participants. The group was segregated into breakout rooms, where each group discussed one of the five answers to the poll.

The group focusing on civic education discussed both short- and long-term goals to increase public knowledge regarding the electoral system. They noted that a high percentage of uninformed voters, especially when they presume their own expertise on the subject, poses a potential threat to election security. The group emphasized that a call to action is necessary to educate the public on how to vote. Local media will be integral to this effort because local information is ultimately most useful given the varying voting regulations in each jurisdiction.

The group discussing the threats posed by the media expressed concern about how the polarization of the news cycle leads to confirmation biases and reinforces prejudices on both sides of the political spectrum. They stressed both the tendency to editorialize and amplify conspiracy theories and the importance of civic education in evaluating the credibility of media sources. Given that certain news sources have a greater likelihood of propagating disinformation, it is critical that voters have the necessary education to separate fact from fiction in their chosen news sources. Voters with more education can be vigilante and identify election related disinformation with

greater ease. One participant noted the Durham investigation may be released prior to the election to influence the news cycle and impact voters.

The group discussing fears of inept election administration emphasized that concern should be placed on the occurrences at a state and local level, specifically the precinct level where there have been reductions in polling places. They stressed that outreach should be done at an individual voter level to help guide voters navigating voting amid a pandemic. For many, this may be the first time voting by mail, and the election infrastructure must support accurately completing the application as poll workers do at in-person voting sites. This should include personalized engagement, although they noted that important individual connection may be missing this year without poll workers. Additionally, the misconception that the result will be determined election night must be eliminated. Unrealistic expectations that our infrastructure can declare a winner the night of the election with the inundation of mail-in ballots could lead to serious undermining of voter confidence in a legitimate and secure election.

The group discussing the consensus highest rated threat to election security, domestic interference, looked to policy solutions. Some members suggested paper backups for all election systems. Others said vote-by-mail must be more accessible, but they ran into complications on how to enforce this as individual states control election laws so federal legislation enforcing rules may violate state sovereignty and the strength of disaggregated federalism. Rather, some suggested challenging campaign finance rules by combatting dark money and establishing national databases, for instance. The group also focused on the role of social media. Some participants suggested more robust transparency, and others offered examples of social media companies refusing to allow election-related content in the weeks before the election contrasted by a federal database of purchased social media ads on other platforms. While the group found that states, independent companies, and social norms must ultimately be responsible for preventing domestic interference, one possible federal measure would be establishing more independence for the inspectors general to investigate wrongdoings.

The final group discussed foreign interference in U.S. elections and concluded that perhaps the greatest threat here is that it may lead to people questioning the outcome of the election. The group emphasized that parties differ vastly in assessing the threat of foreign interference and that findings on foreign interference must be transparent and given with enough time and context for healthy public discourse. In this case, and more generally, education is needed to avoid disinformation, misconceptions, and conspiracies.

Session Four: Strategies for Restoring Confidence in Elections

Session Background:

This session focused on a fundamental question: How can governments restore the confidence of their citizens in the integrity of our elections? Recent well-documented acts of foreign interference have shaken the confidence of voters in our system of government. If measures are enacted to prevent the spread of disinformation and the influence of dark money on American elections, government and civic leaders will still need to develop strategies to address the loss of confidence in the integrity of our government system.

Foreign interference in elections is only one issue currently undermining voter confidence in democracy. In a recent CNAS report, [*Combatting Populism: A Toolkit for Liberal Democratic Actors*](#), [Andrea Kendall-Taylor](#) and [Carisa Nietzsche](#) note that there are other “deeper sources of discontent with democracy... income inequality, immigration, voter suppression, and the role of money in politics.” Can leaders restore confidence in government by actions limiting foreign influence alone? If not, are there strategies that address multiple threats to elections simultaneously? What methods of communication and community mobilization can prevent foreign influence, decrease polarization, and renew faith in democratic norms? In today’s highly polarized political climate, is there a way to de-politicize election security?

Summary:

This session, closed to the public, began with three polls. The first poll asked, “Which of the following best describes your level of confidence that votes cast by mail in the 2020 presidential election will be accurately counted?” with the options: high confidence, moderate confidence, unsure, low confidence, and no confidence. The next poll asked the same but substituted “in-person voting” for “votes cast by mail,” and the third asked for the level of confidence that “security of voting infrastructure has improved since 2016?”

The moderator cited evidence of voter fears and lack of confidence and asked the group if low voter confidence is an issue of perception versus reality. The resultant discussion concluded that voter confidence should be assessed at a local level, as each jurisdiction sets its own rules that may impact how likely votes will be accurately counted. One member stressed that paperless systems should not be trusted but that for those in states with paper ballots used with computer ballots, voters should have strong confidence. Some members expressed concern that student votes will be inaccurately counted and focused on efforts to involve universities in helping students register and vote in the state in which they attend school. Others saw fears about student disenfranchisement as a larger threat to disenchanting youth from the belief that voting is legitimate and safe, which may lead to lifelong suspicion in the voting process. Thus, key to fixing the perception problem is fixing the reality problem. However, the group ran into issues in addressing the reality as changes are made on a local level, and even when federal aid is offered, local governments have rejected such help.

The moderator then discussed how a new mechanism is needed to allow the intelligence community to more rapidly disseminate information to the public. Some said that sources and methods should be protected, and that trust must be placed in oversight committees. Others suggested the intelligence community should operate with greater transparency regarding threats to the election with trusted intelligence community leaders speaking publicly on these issues. Lastly, it was mentioned that the intelligence community needs to build a repetitive, public facing process to convey messages. Some said this would be useful for future elections but feared this is not applicable currently as misinformation is generated by the White House and agencies.

In groups, conference members discussed how to increase voter confidence regarding both domestic consequences and foreign consequences and how to specifically increase voter confidence in mail-in voting between now and the election.

Group one explored a conflict in using short-term fixes to elevate voter confidence that may be more expedient now but may have issues later on when applying them. They stressed the importance of a natural path in applying processes to avoid interference or difficult application. This group noted the possible hypocrisy in the United States imposing and allowing international sanctions for U.S. election interference given the United States' own role in some elections. Additionally, it poses the question of who to address—individuals or the country as a whole. The group concluded that education is the key to addressing confidence. Voter attitudes are often generational and, accordingly, it may take generations to change and restore voter confidence.

Group two discussed the role of legislation in establishing voter confidence. The group was cautious of the role of federal legislation given the importance of federalism in our system that values state sovereignty over elections. In assessing how to find the locus of responsibility for disinformation, the group concluded that it is either 80% individual responsibility and 20% social/cultural or the reverse. Some argued that combatting disinformation requires a multi-lateral, multi-stakeholder response with many actors involved in bolstering social resilience, specifically media and digital literacy. Additionally, government actors and companies need to work together to increase security, prevent hack operations, and educate individuals.

Group three maintained that to make voters confident, the reality must come first, using drop boxes for mail-in voting and creative new voting and educational venues on the state and local level to provide practical examples of voting's legitimacy. One member emphasized that we are not in a static situation but in the midst of an authoritarian state capture ongoing since President Trump's rise to power. Over time, every state agency and department has been and continues to be hijacked and transformed by President Trump and his agents to serve his private ends. Many of these state agencies have been completely transformed—an authoritarian ruler does not abolish elections or agencies; they just alter them into their desired structures. Therefore, we must establish horizontal bonds and identify people who can be trusted, often found in local authorities, and emphasize the importance of our institutional resilience that justifies the continuing legitimacy and trust in local officials.

Group four focused on framing voting as a civic duty and engaging in civic education to get people to vote and shift public perception of voting as not only a right but an obligation. The group asked how to get universities to put greater effort into mobilizing their students to vote and instilling an obligation to vote. In the next 50 days, the group hoped that centralized places to get messages out in each community will communicate that voters must vote, even though it is difficult, and provide information or sources of information. The group emphasized the utility of an organized campaign in achieving such efforts.

Group five concluded the session by pointing out one source of low confidence—cues taken from leaders who have an interest in sowing low voter confidence. The group stated that election officials and political leaders must issue statements of confidence and flaws. The group suggested that low confidence could be good if harnessed for change to improve the system. While the group pushed for a more aggressive foreign interference stance, it stressed that a framework to accomplish this already exists in the sanction system and that a more apolitical approach is also necessary. Lastly, they emphasized the nuances of the domestic interference question due to the power of the First Amendment and fears of violating free speech in attacking domestically spread

misinformation. They do believe, however, that a system of criminal or civil penalties for spreading misinformation or targeting voter confidence is possible, but because of the inherent conflict with free speech, it would require a high threshold before such penalties could be assessed.

Participant List and Resources from the Project appear on the next pages.

Participant List

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RESOURCES FROM THE PROJECT

Commentary Series: *Bolstering American Democracy Against Threats to the 2020 Elections*

[There's still time to protect American democracy against threats to the 2020 elections, by Carrie Cordero and Claire Finkelstein](#), August 13, 2020

[European lessons for tackling election interference](#), by Erik Brattberg, August 18, 2020

[The growing threat of domestic disinformation in Poland](#), by Nina Jankowicz, August 20, 2020

[Protecting election integrity by prohibiting deception and disenfranchisement](#), by Chimène Keitner, August 25, 2020

[America needs a 'we need you' message to counter foreign election interference](#), by Dan Vallone, September 1, 2020

[Partnerships to protect democracy: States vs. nation-states](#), by Scott Bates, September 8, 2020

[#Protect2020](#), by Christopher C. Krebs, September 15, 2020

[Videocast of the Public Sessions](#)

Patterns of Foreign Election Interference Since 2016

Voter Attitudes and Foreign Influence: Protecting the Vote

Podcast: [A Conversation on Bolstering American Democracy](#)

With Carrie Cordero, Claire Finkelstein, and Christopher C. Krebs, Director of the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)